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NOTES
DOMESTIC RELATIONS - Custody - Refusal to
Award Custody of Retarded Child to State Where
Parents Would Not Permit Heart Surgery. In Re
Philip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48
(1979), cert. denied sub nom. Bothman v. Warren B.,
48 U.S.L.W. 3623 (1980).
INTRODUCTION

Two issues posing difficult questions for courts are: when,
if ever, should a court take custody of a child from his parents; and, what extent of care should a mentally retarded person receive. In re Phillip B.1 combined these questions. The
California court was confronted with the issue of whether to
remove custody of a twelve-year-old mentally retarded child
from his parents to perform life-extending surgery after the
parents refused to permit the operation. The issue was further
complicated by the fact that Phillip had never lived in the
home of his parents, and the supervisors at the care home
where Phillip lived believed the operation should be
performed.
Four legal considerations are addressed in discussing these
two issues. The first is defining the standard or test for removal. The second is determining the constitutional right to
habilitation. The third is whether quality of life is an appropriate factor for a court to consider; and the fourth is the conflict of interest problem. In spite of the difficulty of the questions here presented, the case does not draw the attention it
deserves without a thorough understanding of the facts.2
I.

PHILLIP B.

Phillip B. is a Down's syndrome child3 who was placed in a
1. 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979), cert. denied sub nom. Bothman
v. Warren B., 48 U.S.L.W. 3623 (1980).

2. Proof of the fact that some of the issues in this case do'not receive full consideration when digested is the headline of the case appearing in the Family Law Reporter. It stated, "Refusal to order life-extending but risky surgery for a minor is

upheld." 5 Faro. L. Rep. 2593 (BNA 1979).
3. Down's syndrome is also referred to as Mongolism.
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private care institution at birth. Mentally, he was tested as
having an I.Q. that measured slightly under sixty." Functionally, Phillip was able to dress himself and do chores at the
private care facility. These chores included making his bed,
helping clear the table, folding laundry, putting away groceries, and feeding the cat. Phillip was found to have good motor
skills and good visual skills. It was likely that he would be
placed in a sheltered workshop at some time in the future.
Shortly before 1973, doctors discovered that Phillip had a
cardiac problem. In early 1973, Phillip was referred to a pediatric cardiologist for further diagnostic evaluation. The doctor
made a clinical diagnosis of a ventricular septal defect (a hole
between the two main pumping chambers of the heart) and
elevated pulmonary artery pressure, a problem usually associated with a large defect. A cardiac catheterization was recommended. A catheterization is a simple, safe procedure to discover more about the problem, but Phillip's parents refused to
allow it to be performed. They gave no reason for this
decision.
In 1977, Philip was again referred to the pediatrician, this
time for evaluation before undergoing extensive dental work
which was best performed under general anesthesia. The dentist wanted to know exactly the extent of Philip's heart condition before performing the dental surgery. To ascertain this,
a cardiac catheterization was done.5 The pediatrician reviewed
his findings with Phillip's parents and recommended an operation to cure the defect. This particular operation held a lower
risk for younger patients, a risk which increased as the patient
grew older. Eventually, a time would be reached when the risk
would be so great that the procedure could no longer be done
at all.' Mr. B.'s response, however, was to request more psychological information about Philip, and Mrs. B. requested

4. Children with an I.Q. (Intelligence Quotient) over 50 are classified as mildly
retarded. M. BEGAB, THE MENTALLY RETARDED CHILD (1964). The author stated,
"[T]hose in the upper range of mild retardation can develop social and communication skills and are quite independent in self care." Id. at 28.
5. Phillip's parents permitted the procedure at this time so that dental work could
be performed.
6. "Without the operation, Phillip will begin to function less physically until he
will be severely incapacitated ....
Without the surgery, Phillip may live at the outset 20 more years." 92 Cal. App. 3d at 799, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
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the names of parents of other Down's syndrome children so
she might talk to them. Finally, they refused to let Phillip
have the operation. Juvenile authorities brought an action to
get custody of Phillip on the ground that the parents were not
providing Phillip with the necessities of life. The trial court
denied the petition, and the order was affirmed by the court
of appeals.
II. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
A.

Standardfor Removal From ParentalCustody

There are basically two points of view on the question of
custody rights:
[The] traditional view still followed by many states holds
that a parent is prima facie entitled to the custody of the
child unless shown to be unfit. Anyone who alleges the parent is unfit must establish the unsuitability of the parent.
The remnants of the old concept of a parent's property
rights in his child are operative under this rule. Under the
more contemporary view, the prevailing criteria revolve
around the "best interest of the child." Under this rule the
court will award custody to the person or agency that the
court finds will best promote the child's welfare. 7
California follows the contemporary view using the criteria of
"best interests of the child." 8 To determine if the parent-child
relationship should be severed, the threshold question is:
would allowing the child to continue in the parents' custody
endanger the child's permanent welfare? 9 If so, the parents'
rights must give way, their preservation being less important
than the health, safety, morals, and welfare of the child.,,
While California law looks first to the welfare of the child, it
is important to note that the court must determine both that
removal is in the best interests of the child and that a clear

7. Thomas, Child Abuse and Neglect, PartI: Historical Overview, Legal Matrix
and Social Perspectives, 50 N.C. L. Rev. 293, 340 (1972).
8. Wisconsin takes a compromise approach using both views. Under Wis. STAT. §
48.40(2) (1977) there must first be a finding of neglect. Removal must then be determined to be in the child's best interest. See State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social
Services, 68 Wis. 2d 36, 227 N.W.2d 643 (1975).
9. In re Imperatricis Guardianship, 182 Cal. 355, 188 P. 48 (1920).
10. 182 Cal. at 356, 188 P. at 50.
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showing of harm is present.1 1
California recognizes the well-accepted general principle
that parenting is a fundamental right which should only be
disturbed in extreme circumstances.1 2 But it also recognizes
the exception that the parents' rights are limited by the fact
that the child himself is a human being and, as such, is vested
with rights entitled to protection.1 3 Importantly, genuine love
and concern for the child, coupled with a desire to help the
child, does not defeat a clear showing of potential harm
should the child remain in the parents' custody. 4 As a result,
5
courts will not view parental behavior in a vacuum.1
Recent decisions emphasize that parental behavior must
be viewed in the context of its effect on the child. In re Custody of a Minor'6 considered the situation of a twenty-monthold boy suffering from lymphocetic leukemia who was being
treated by the only known effective treatment, chemotherapy.
Doctors predicted a better than fifty percent chance of longterm survival with the chemotherapy, but the parents, concerned over side effects, wanted to remove the child from
chemotherapy and treat him through prayer and dietary manipulation. Their genuine good motives were not important.
The court intervened in the family relationship, but only to
the extent necessary to insure that the child received the
needed chemotherapy.
Several considerations justified such intervention. The
treatment itself was not life-threatening, while the lack of
11. In re B. G., 11 Cal. 3d 679, 699, 523 P.2d 244, 255, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444, 458
(1974).
12. In re Carmaleta B., 21 Cal. 3d 482, 579 P.2d 514, 146 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1978).
13. Campbell v. Wright, 130 Cal. 380, 62 P. 614 (1900).
14. In re Randy B., 62 Cal. App. 3d 89, 132 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1976). Other courts
support this view. See generally Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)
(Neither the rights of parenthood nor the rights of religion are beyond limitation.
The state's authority is not nullified because the parents ground their claim to control the child's course of conduct in religion.); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 462, 181
A.2d 751 (1962) (The sincere affection and concern of Jehovah's Witnesses parents
for their child were not controlling in finding neglect of the child for the purpose of
appointing a guardian.).
15. California statutory law also emphasizes that the first consideration must be
the child's welfare. The Civil Code provides for removal of custody on a finding "that
an award of custody to a parent would be detrimental to the child, and an award to a

non-parent will be in the best interests of the child." CAL. Civ.
1980).
16. 4 FA,.

L. REP. 2432 (BNA 1978).

CODE

§ 4600(c) (West
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treatment was certain to result in death. This fact distinguished this case from cases where the court refused to intervene when the treatment itself threatened life, but the lack of
treatment would not cause death.17 Generally, courts will require treatment only where an imminent risk of death exists."8
In very limited situations, courts have ordered surgery where
the child's condition could not cause death, but where permanent disfigurement was sure to result.1 9
A New York Court of Appeals decision contemporaneous
with the California Court of Appeals decision of In re Phillip
B., added an additional consideration when removal of custody was sought for medical treatment. In the New York case,
In re Hofbauer,20 the parents of a seven-year-old child suffering from Hodgkin's disease wanted to remove their child from
traditional radiation and chemotherapy treatments to put him
under the care of a physician who advocated nutritional therapy including laetrile injections. The Court allowed the parents to do this because the alternative was supported by the
opinion of responsible physicians.2
The United States Supreme Court has held that decisions
related to medical feasibility should be made by medical practitioners. The Court has stated: "[W]e do not accept the notion that the shortcomings of specialists can always be
avoided by shifting the decision from a trained specialist using traditional tools of medical science to an untrained
judge.

' 22

This decision reflects the high credibility given to ex-

17. Id. at 2435. See generallyIn re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972); In re
Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820 (1955); In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126
P.2d 765 (1942).
18. See State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962); People v. Labrenz, 41
IM. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952) cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952).
19. In re Sampson, 29 N.Y.2d 900, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972); In re Rotkowitz, 175
Misc. 948, 25 N.Y.S.2d 624 (1941).

20. 47 N.Y.2d 648, 419 N.Y.S.2d 936 (1979).
21. Specifically, the court held:
The court's inquiry should be whether the parents once having sought accred-

ited medical assistance and having been made aware of the seriousness of the
child's affliction and the possibility of a cure if a certain mode of treatment is
undertaken, have provided for their child a treatment which is recommended
by their physician and which has not been totally rejected by all responsible
medical authority.
47 N.Y.2d at 652, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 940-41.
22. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
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pert medical testimony.
In the case of In re Phillip B., the medical experts testified
that Phillip's heart condition would cause his death at any
time within the next two to eighteen years, but surgery to repair the problem could only be performed at the present time.
The trial court" ruled, however, that the surgery was not lifesaving and that there was no clear and convincing evidence of
detriment to the child. In its decision, the court noted that
medical experts have made mistakes before.
The trial judge's method of reaching a finding of fact
about the effect of Phillip B.'s heart condition is contradictory
to the United States Supreme Court opinion in Parham v.
J.R.24 The judge simply ignored uncontradicted testimony
that without surgery, Phillip B.'s heart condition would cause
his death. By doing this, the judge made a decision as to Phillip's future by focusing primarily on his parents' genuine concern rather than on the best interests of the child. On appeal,
the California Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision on the basis that Phillip's condition was not immediately
life-threatening, but the corrective surgery might be. 25
B.

The ConstitutionalRight to Habilitation

Phillip B. had been institutionalized from birth. Any person
confined to a mental institution has a constitutional right to
habilitation.2" In such cases no distinction is made between
the mentally ill and the mentally retarded.27 Courts defining
habilitation have determined it to be "medical treatment, education, and care suited to residents' needs regardless of age,
degree of retardation and handicapping condition. ' 28 The purpose of such a requirement is to allow the individual to lead a
more useful and meaningful life and return to society. Adequate and effective treatment is constitutionally required because absent such treatment, the hospital is transformed into
a penitentiary where one could be held indefinitely for no con23. In re Phillip B., No. 66103 (Superior Court, Santa Clara Co., April 27, 1978).
24. 442 U.S. 584.
25. See 92 Cal. App. 3d at 802, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 51.
26. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), modified on other
grounds, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
27. 344 F. Supp. at 390.
28. Id. at 396.
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victed offense.2 9 One court has summed up the right to habilitation as follows:
The constitutional right to treatment is a right to a program
of treatment that affords the individual a reasonable chance
to acquire and maintain those life skills that enable him to
cope as effectively as his own capacities permit with the demands of his own person and of his environment and to
raise the level of his physical, mental, and social efficiency. s°
While the courts have defined the constitutional right to habilitation, implementation of the right is not automatic particularly when other rights overlap. In re Phillip B. illustrates this. Philip B. was placed in a private institution at
birth, and seven years later when his heart condition was discovered, his parents, by exercising their custody rights, prevented evaluation through a simple, safe heart catheterization.
The catheterization was finally agreed to when Phillip was 12
years old as a prerequisite to dental surgery. At that time it
was discovered that the condition was operable, but the operation would have to be done immediately because of progressive deterioration. The parents were supported in their decision not to operate by the California Court of Appeals which
claimed the surgery was now too risky.3 1 In effect, the parents
foreclosed the right to habilitation by preventing the earlier
evaluation at which time surgery would have involved a lower
risk. One commentator noted:
[T]he greatest danger to the mentally retarded child lies in
the institutional setting - in this case because it affords the
parents the opportunity to "distance" themselves from the
child and deal with .the situation in an abstract manner,
namely, in the doctor's office instead of at home where the
cries of the child are a constant call to the normal parental
instincts and an impetus to reconsider the decision not to
operate.3 1

29. Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943, 950 (D.C. 1960).
30. Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437 F. Supp. 1209, 1219 (E.D. La. 1976).
31. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 802, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 48. Paradoxically, the appeals court
also stated the surgery was too risky since children with Down's syndrome have more
problems in the postoperative period. In other words, Phillip was institutionalized
because he was retarded, but surgery, a recognized habilitation right, was now denied
Phillip since his parents had not permitted it when it would have been safe.
32. Murdock, Civil Rights of the Mentally Retarded: Some Critical Issues, 48
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The problem for a court is to determine when one right
should take precedence over another conflicting right. The
California Supreme Court has defined custody as "the sum of
parental rights with respect to the rearing of a child. It includes the right to the child's services and earnings, and the
right to direct activities and make decisions regarding his
care, control, education, health, and religion." 3 When parents
permanently institutionalize a child, they actually surrender a
major portion of their custody rights. In such a situation, it
must be questioned whether the parents are in a position to
determine best interests of the child.
In Quilloin v. Walcott,3 4 the United States Supreme Court
held that the state may consider the parents' past commitment to the child's development in determining the extent to
which their parental rights will be recognized. Where there
has been little ongoing parental commitment, parental rights
diminish accordingly. On the basis of this decision, courts may
be able to give less weight to the medical decision of parents
who have surrendered actual custody. Therefore, a court may
enforce the right of habilitation when a child has been placed
in an institutional setting even where the parents opt not to
grant permission for life-saving or even life-extending surgery.
C.

Quality of Life Consideration

The trial court in In re PhillipB. considered quality of life
in reaching its decision. The court received testimony about
the quality of Phillip's life: Phillip B.'s father admitted that
he felt Phillip would be better off dead than alive. 5 But, two
fundamental issues arise concerning this testimony: (1) May a
court ever consider quality of life testimony? and, (2) If so,
under what circumstances is it proper to consider quality of
life testimony?

NoTRE DAME LAW. 133, 142 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Murdock].

33. Burge v. City and County of San Francisco, 41 Cal. 2d 608, -, 262 P.2d 6, 12
(1953).
34. 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978).
35. In closing argument, the attorney stated, "If I might paraphrase what I think
seems the Becker's position ... it seems to be that it would be preferable that Phillip's life end early, instead of going through a full life with what is obviously an extremely serious handicap." In re Philip B., No. 66103, at 134 (Super. Ct., Santa Clara
Co., April 27, 1978), (trial transcript).
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In re Quinlan"6 is a case in which the court examined a
portion of this issue. Medical testimony predicted that the
young woman would never regain cognitive life and would
need intensive care throughout the day. The extraordinary
circumstances of this case necessitated the court's decision
and it must be viewed accordingly. The court appointed the
parents as guardians knowing they would exercise
their choice
37
to refuse medical treatment for their daughter.

The decision is much more difficult when a person is capable of cognitive life. Few courts have considered the issue, 8
though it is a major consideration for parents of physically
disabled, mentally retarded newborns.39 In Maine Medical
Center v. Houle,'0 the court held that quality of life should
not be considered and that the only proper consideration is
medical feasibility.
There are several significant reasons for not considering
quality of life. First, if a court determines that it will consider
such a factor, it is put in a position of determining that some
point exists at which life is no longer worth living. Second,
there is the problem of "ascertaining another's wishes ...
(with) . . .the proxy's bias to personal or culturally relative

interests, and the unreliability of predictive criteria."'41 Third,
given the historical abuse that the concept "lives without
value" has engendered,'42 courts are hesitant to create precedent in this area. Fourth, most legal commentators who have
discussed terminating life-sustaining treatment feel that it is
not legal. 43 Finally, there is the constitutional consideration
that denial of treatment because of mental defect is in viola-

36. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
37. 70 N.J. at , 355 A.2d at 664.
38. See Birth-Defective Infants: A Standard for Nontreatment Decisions, 30
STAN. L. REV. 599, 601 n.13 (1977).
39. See Robertson, Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective Newborns: A Legal
Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REv.213 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Involuntary Euthanasia].
40. Civil No. 74-145 (Super. Ct., Cumberland City, Maine, Feb. 14, 1972).
41. Involuntary Euthansia, supra note 39, at 255.
42. See generally United States v. Greifelt, Nuremberg Military Tribunals, Trials
of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council
Law No. 10, 599 (1950).
43. See Horan, Euthanasia,Medical Treatment and the Mongoloid Child:Death
As a Treatment of Choice? 27 BAYLOR L. REv. 76 (1975); Nolan-Haley, Defective
Children, Their Parents,and the Death Decision, J. LEGAL ME., Jan. 1976, at 9;
Involuntary Euthanasia,supra note 39.
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tion of equal protection.
In light of the general rule against considering quality of
life in making medical treatment determinations, any court
which receives testimony on such an issue and bases its decision even partially on this testimony should be considered to
have abused its discretion. Such testimony was considered in
the case of In re Phillip B. Nevertheless, the appeals court
refused to find an abuse of discretion in this case. By finding
that the surgery would be risky," the court skirted the real
issue of how the decision was reached. However, the court added, "Legal judgments regarding the value of childrearing patterns should be kept to a minimum so long as the child is
afforded the best available opportunity to fulfill his potential
in society. ' 45 While the quote indicates that the appeals court
would agree with the general rule of not considering quality of
life, it is difficult to reconcile its decision to affirm the trial
court. How is Phillip to have the opportunity to fulfill his own
potential when he is not to be given the opportunity for medical treatment to preserve that life?
D.

Conflict of Interest Problem

The court determined the controversy by using the test of
best interests of the child.46 The controversy under the conflict of interest problem concerns not what the standard or
test is, but who is to decide what is in the child's best interests. If there is a conflict of interest, the court may determine
that the parents can no longer decide.
The potential conflict of interest between the parent's values and what is best for the child has been recognized in the
decision to institutionalize the child.47 The nature of the conflict to institutionalize was summarized in the amici brief of
Wyatt v. Stickney:
The parent may be motivated to ask for such institutionalization for a variety of reasons other than the best interests
of the child himself, i.e., the interests of other children in
the family, mental and physical frustration, economic stress,
44.
45.
46.
47.

92 Cal. App. 3d at 802, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 51.
Id. at 801, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 51.
See text accompanying note 9 supra.
Murdock, supra note 32, at 139.
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hostility toward the child stemming from the added pressures of caring for him, and perceived stigma of mental retardation. The retarded child's best interests may well be in
living with his family and
in the community, but theirs may
4
not be in keeping him. 8
When a child has been institutionalized, the parents must
deal with the child's concerns in the abstract, and they may
not always be aware of the needs of such a child.' 9
A close legal parallel exists between the position of the
mentally retarded children in need of physical care and the
situation involving medical care for children of the Jehovah's
Witnesses.50 Courts have ordered blood transfusions for children over their parents' religiously based objections because
the child's best interests require it and harm would otherwise
result. 51 In such cases the parents faced the conflicting demands of their faith and the needs of their child. Where treatment is suggested that violates their religious beliefs, it is the
parents' religious responsibility to see that no member of the
family receives treatments which are considered immoral. If a
family member receives such treatments, the parents fear
52
spiritual harm to the family member and themselves.
"Parents have a duty of care, and if they grossly abuse it,
religious objections stand as no excuse," 53 though reasonable
attempt must be made to accommodate the belief." When a
parent has a serious conflict of interest, the parent should not
be allowed to be the sole decision-maker regarding medical
care for the child. 5 While courts have shown an awareness of
a conflict of interest in cases involving religious beliefs, it is
clear that a conflict can exist for other than first amendment
48. Id. at 139.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 142.
51. See e.g., Jehovah's Witnesses in Wash. v. King County Hosp. Unit No. 1
(Harborview), 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967), afl'd per curiam, 390 U.S. 598
(1968); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890
(1962); Hoerner v. Bertinato, 67 N.J. Super. 517, 171 A.2d 140 (1961).
52. Jehovah's Witnesses in Wash. v. King County Hosp. Unit No. 1 (Harborview),
278 F. Supp. 488, 502 (W.D. Wash. 1967).
53. Bennett, Allocation of Child Medical Care DecisionmakingAuthority: A Suggested Interest Analysis, ,62 VA. L. REv. 285, 324 (1976), [hereinafter cited as
Bennett].
54. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
55. Bennett, supra note 52, at 324.
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reasons which have just as valid a basis and which prevent the
parents from being qualified to determine the best interests of
the"child.
Though such conflict was expressed in the case In re Phillip B., the court expressed no concern about it.56 Since those
who lived with Phillip on a day-to-day basis felt Philip
needed the operation and brought suit seeking custody, the
court should have considered the parental conflict of interest
as a significant factor. However, the court failed to consider
this factor and, therefore, never confronted the important issue of who is to decide the child's best interests when such a
conflict exists.
The appeals court recognized that parental autonomy is
not absolute but also stated that the state "has a serious bur'57
den of justification before abridging parental authority.
When there is a conflict of interest such as the one in Phillip's
case, the "serious burden" is met and the parents should be
relieved of their power as sole decision-maker over the child's
medical care.
III. SUMMARY

A case such as In re Phillip B. is disturbing because it demonstrates that the law remains inconsistent and unsettled in
dealing with the medical rights of mentally retarded children.
Courts have held that an institutionalized child has a right to
habilitation, but statutes allow that right to be circumvented.
In re Phillip B. is a decision that is particularly difficult to
rationalize. Legally, the parent is the person whose decision is
almost completely dispositive regarding the medical care of
his child. Clear and convincing evidence is needed to remove
the child from the custody of his parents and override the
parent's decision. However, when the parents have institu56. The trial transcript in In re PhillipB. indicates that the Beckers institutionalized Phillip because, ironically, they felt he would get better health care, and also
because they were worried about how his presence in the home could affect their
other children. After stating that Phillip would be better off dead, Mr. Becker said he
based this belief on what he thought was best for Phillip and for the rest of the
family. Also, Mr. Becker expressed concern that if Phillip oVtlived him and his wife,
he would become a burden on his brothers. This illustrates the conflict with which
Murdock was concerned.
57. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 802, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 51.
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tionalized the child from birth and visit the child for several
hours on the average of once every two months, it is hard to
justify allowing the parents to retain the same dominant
power over health care decisions as they would if the child
were living at home. Such parents are not in as good a position to judge the best interests of the child as those who have
become the "psychological parents" 58 making the day-to-day
custodial decisions for the child. The parents should make
medical decisions when they are qualified to do so. However,
as the United States Supreme Court indicates, when their
commitment to the child has been less than that of the dayto-day parent, a lesser emphasis should be placed on their
decisions.59
WILLIAM A. MOELLER

TRADEMARKS -

Trademarks and Tradenames -

Actions for Infringement of Technical Marks
Equated with Those for Infringement of Nontechnical Marks Which Have Acquired a Secondary Meaning. First Wisconsin National Bank of Milwaukee v.
Wichman, 85 Wis. 2d 54, 270 N.W.2d 168 (1978). In
the recent case of FirstNationalBank of Milwaukee v. Wichman,1 the Wisconsin Supreme Court abolished the traditional
common-law distinctions between actions brought for infringement of technical trademarks2 and those commenced to
protect nontechnical trademarks' which had acquired a secondary meaning.4 By its decision, the court expanded the scope
of protection available to nontechnical marks with secondary
meaning and eliminated the necessity of a plaintiff's proving
58. See J. GOLDSTEIN,
CHILD 17-21

A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE

(1973).

59. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978).

1. 85 Wis. 2d 54, 270 N.W.2d 168 (1978).
2. 3 R. CALLMAN,THE LAw OF UNFAIR COMPETITION,

TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES

(3d ed. 1969), § 66.1, at 21-22 [hereinafter cited as 3 R.CALLMAN].
3. Id.
4. 25 Mo. L. REV. 100, 101 (1960).

